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I. INTRODUCTION
District of Columbia v. Heller1 is arguably the most important decision
of the 2007–2008 Supreme Court term. Pertaining to gun control, the case
was met with a deluge of articles ranging from issues of judicial
minimalism, to constitutional originalism, to the rules versus standards
debate.2 One important point was overlooked by commentators, however:
the fact that Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, came close to
introducing the significant European doctrine of proportionality into
American constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, arguing against the use
of a categorical strict scrutiny test in the application of the Second
Amendment, Breyer stated:
[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in
practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by
the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety
concerns on the other . . . .

1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122
HARV. L. REV. 145 (2008); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future
in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035 (2008); Richard Schragger, The Last
Progressive: Justice Breyer, Heller, and “Judicial Judgment,” 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 283
(2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008); J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265118; Mark
Tushnet, Two Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller (Harvard Pub. Law Working
Paper, Paper No. 08-17, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1189494; Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, The Year of
the Gun: Second Amendment Rights and the Supreme Court, 86 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
22 (2008), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/pdfs/yeargun.pdf.
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. . . Contrary to the majority’s unsupported suggestion that this sort of
“proportionality” approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied it in various
constitutional contexts, including election-law cases, speech cases, and due
process cases.3

The tremendous influence and importance of the doctrine of proportionality
in European constitutional law, as well as many other constitutional
systems, cannot be overstated. Proportionality, which essentially requires
that rights infringement be proportional to governmental ends, is arguably
the most dominant doctrine in constitutional adjudication worldwide.4
Since the 1970s, it has expanded to almost every democracy across the
globe.5 Currently, proportionality is one of the defining features of what
can be termed global constitutionalism.
The use of the term “proportionality” by a Justice as well-versed in
European constitutional law as Breyer cannot be seen as pure coincidence.6
3. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
4. See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159, 171–76 (2004);
Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369,
370–73 (2007); Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 384–85 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803 (2004) (presenting a
critique of Beatty’s approach); Francis G. Jacobs, Recent Developments in the Principle
of Proportionality in European Community Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 1, 1 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999); Jeffery Jowell & Anthony Lester,
Proportionality: Neither Novel nor Dangerous, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
51, 53–55 (J.L. Jowell & D. Oliver eds., 1988); Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and
the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in
LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 139–41
(G. Pavlakos ed., 2007); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV.
652, 693–95 (2005); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 73–74 (2008).
5. For a detailed description of the rapid spread of proportionality analysis around
the globe, see Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 4, at 74–75, 111–59.
6. Justice Breyer specifically referred to the proportionality approach in his book,
Active Liberty. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 48–49 (2005). Justice Breyer also participated in a 2001 Yale Law
School seminar titled, “Global Constitutionalism: Privacy, Proportionality, The Political
Case” (copies of the materials that were distributed among the participants are compiled
with the authors). In addition, Justice Breyer has participated in several Salzburg global
law seminars. Salzburg Global Seminar, The Honorable Justice Breyer, http://www.
salzburgseminar.org/2009/includes/FacultyPopUp.cfm?IDSPECIAL_EVENT=264&ID
Records=637 (last visited May 31, 2009). The Salzburg Global Seminar is an American
nongovernmental organization that conducts seminars on law, economics, and politics,
and it has proven to be an important forum for dialogue and exchange of ideas amongst
leading American and non-American legal scholars and jurists. Accordingly, there
appears to be a general view of judicial globalization. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 70 (2004); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial
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Justice Breyer has used the word proportionality before, but always in
the same sense that it bears in common spoken language—proportionate
versus disproportionate, or the proportionality of a restriction.7 Heller
appears to be the first case in which Breyer explicitly used proportionality
as a term of art, by using the phrase “proportionality approach.”8
Arguably, at least two messages are implicit in Breyer’s deliberate use of
this term: (1) that the doctrine of proportionality is analogous to the
American concept of balancing interests; and (2) that proportionality is
part of American constitutional law. Given the centrality of proportionality
analysis in so many other legal systems, the ramifications of these messages
are great. The inherent implication is that American constitutional law is
not as different from European constitutional law as some commentators
and Justices would suggest.9 Breyer’s dissent in Heller thus marks an
important stage in the Court’s ongoing debate over the relationship of
U.S. constitutional law with foreign constitutional law.
This last step in the foreign law debate is interesting and important in
at least two respects. First, the allusion to foreign constitutional law in
Heller is implicit rather than explicit. Despite his reference to proportionality,
not a sole foreign legal authority was cited by Justice Breyer. Rather, he
based his entire argument for proportionality on decisions from
American case law that, in his view, manifest the doctrine.10 This could
represent a shift in strategy regarding the use of foreign law. Instead of
System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (2003) (arguing that the extensive reference to
foreign law is tied to a common judicial culture that cuts across borders and
jurisdictions); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103,
1104, 1116, 1120 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[The Court] has examined the restrictions’ proportionality, the relation
between restriction and objective, the fit between ends and means.”); Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (“[T]he statutes’ enforcement would disproportionately
harm media freedom.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)
(“Rather, [the Court] has balanced interests. And in practice that has meant asking
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the
statute’s salutary effects upon the others.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 846 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Consequently § 505’s restriction,
viewed in light of the proposed alternative, is proportionate to need. That is to say, it
restricts speech no more than necessary to further that compelling need.”).
8. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
9. See infra note 21.
10. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer cites the following
decisions, the first of which was written by him: Thompson, 535 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (commercial speech); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (election regulation); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976) (due process); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (government employee speech). Only Breyer’s own opinions use
the term “proportional.” The earlier cases he cites all use the term “balancing” rather
than “proportionality.”
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introducing foreign law doctrines directly, an attempt is made to find
them within American constitutional law. This tactic gives foreign law
doctrines American credentials and prevents any criticism over the
infiltration of foreign materials into American law.11 The second respect
in which the Heller dissent is important relates to the use of foreign
methodology, as opposed to foreign substantive ideas. Proportionality,
after all, is a methodology, or a doctrine; it does not entail a substantive
commitment, such as that inherently required by opposition to capital
punishment,12 or sodomy laws,13 or espousing more expansive notions of
equality.14 The implementation of a foreign methodology marks yet
another strategic shift because it can, while appearing neutral, facilitate
the subsequent entry of foreign substantive ideas by creating a common
framework and language in which constitutional dialogue can occur.
These unique features aside, the validity of this reference to the
proportionality approach can still be questioned. In other words, it is
unclear whether Justice Breyer was correct in maintaining that a
proportionality approach is well established in American constitutional
law, or whether Justice Scalia was correct in asserting that Justice
Breyer’s approach is unprecedented.15
This Article first describes the unique attributes of the use of foreign
law in the Heller dissent, and then addresses the soundness of the
specific claim that the United States and Europe share the common
methodology of proportionality. This Article argues that Justice Breyer
11. The strongest criticism against the introduction of foreign law into American
constitutional law is voiced by originalists, who argue that such a move is at odds with
the understanding of the Constitution as a self-contained document that forms the
constituting contract among the individuals who compose the American polity. Thus,
any resort to foreign law cannot be viewed as authoritative. Roger P. Alford, Four
Mistakes in the Debate on “Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 658–60
(2006); Law, supra note 4, at 727–42 (pointing to the democratic deficiency in the
Supreme Court’s use of foreign law). For a more detailed account of the criticism of
reference to foreign law in American constitutional law cases, see infra notes 16–19 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (striking down laws
imposing capital punishment for crimes committed by minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (striking down laws imposing capital punishment for crimes
committed by the mentally disabled).
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–79 (2003) (striking down the Texas
sodomy law that criminalized sodomy between consenting adults).
14. Gutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing
to an international treaty to support the Court’s longstanding determination that raceconscious programs “must have a logical end point”).
15. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
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was correct in his contention that a doctrinal framework very similar to
proportionality is embedded in American constitutional law in the guise
of balancing. However, this Article argues that Breyer missed an
important divergence between the two doctrines: the significantly
different ways in which balancing and proportionality are situated in
America and Europe, respectively, owing to their very different historical,
cultural, and institutional characteristics. Taking a contextual approach
that emphasizes cultural and institutional factors, this Article claims that
the two doctrines are, in fact, quite distinct. Thus, insofar as his claims
are descriptive, simply indicating similarities between American and
European constitutional law, Breyer’s claims are only partially valid
because they disregard context. However, Breyer might have been
engaging in a more normative project: by tossing the term proportionality
into the American constitutional lexicon, he might have been seeking to
create a framework for bringing the operation and thinking of American
constitutional law closer to European constitutional law. This Article
therefore explores some indications that the introduction of proportionality
into the constitutional law of other countries, such as Canada, may have
contributed to their development of a more European frame of mind and
has certainly facilitated more extensive dialogue with Europe.
Part I begins with a review of the Heller decision, demonstrating how
Justice Breyer’s comments were a covert move in the foreign law
debate. Part II discusses the validity of Breyer’s claim of a similarity in
the doctrinal structures of American balancing and European proportionality.
Part II illustrates how different conceptions of constitutional culture and
of the state’s role in the polity produce different approaches towards the
concepts of balancing in the United States and proportionality in Europe,
thereby distinguishing them significantly despite their doctrinal resemblance.
Taking the example of Germany, the birthplace of proportionality and
arguably the most influential European country in terms of constitutional
law, Part II explains that the country’s organic and cooperative
conception of the polity has made proportionality and balancing a central
and intrinsically important feature of its constitutional framework. This
German model of balancing is termed “intrinsic balancing.” In the
United States, greater public suspicion of the Court and of the
government has led to a more minor and subsidiary role for balancing,
causing it to have instrumental rather than intrinsic value. This type of
balancing is termed “bounded balancing.” Part III focuses on structural
differences—the way in which rights are defined in constitutional texts—
to further illustrate the different uses of the concepts of balancing and
proportionality in their respective legal systems. Finally, the Afterword
closes with some thoughts on constitutional borrowing, using the example
of Canada.
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II. HELLER AND THE FOREIGN LAW DEBATE
The debate over the appeal to foreign law in American constitutional
interpretation has been raging in the Court for some time now.
Proponents claim its invaluable contribution in adding the vital perspectives
and experience of other countries.16 They also hint at the inherent
benefits of making U.S. jurisprudence more in tune with the global
constitutional community.17 Opponents, however, stress the dangers of
indeterminacy that arise with the use of foreign law and argue that
foreign materials are irrelevant to internal constitutional interpretation.18
The latter camp is often associated with a strong democratic conception
of the Constitution, viewing it as embodying the particular and distinct
commitments of the American people.19 Foreign law proponents, in
16. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 191 (2003), stating that:
[L]ooking abroad simply helps [Supreme Court Justices] do a better job at
home, in the sense that they can approach a particular problem more creatively
or with greater insight. Foreign authority is persuasive because it teaches them
something they did not know or helps them see an issue in a different and more
tractable light.
Id. at 201.
17. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) (“[C]onsidering foreign and international
law within a framework of learning by engagement—assuming neither convergence nor
disagreement—is a legitimate interpretive tool that offers modest benefits (and fewer
risks than current debate suggests) to the processes of constitutional adjudication.”); see
also Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 835 (1999) (advocating
engagement in comparativism through “dialogical” interpretation).
18. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 807, 819 (2000) (arguing against Justice Breyer’s introduction of foreign law in
Printz, saying that “[t]he dispute is particularly striking because it would be one of the
few instances of a deliberate attempt by a Justice to expand the canon of authoritative
materials from which constitutional common law reasoning might go forward”); Richard
Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at
40, 41 (pointing to the “problem with according even limited precedential weight to
foreign or international decisions [which lies in] the promiscuous opportunities that are
opened up”).
19. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1307
(2005) (reviewing SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, and arguing that “[c]onstitutions are unique
insofar as they are the constitutive document of a political community. As such, the
issue is not so much the content of doctrine but instead its governance—the fact that it
comes out of the constitutional and constitutive processes of a particular community”);
Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 1999 (2004) (“[I]t is critical for constitutional law to be made and interpreted not
by international experts, but by national political actors and judges.”); Robert H. Bork,
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contrast, tend to espouse a more universalistic approach, one that conceives
rights jurisprudence as involving similar problems wherever it develops.20
The foreign law debate is interrelated with the debate regarding the
extent of American constitutional law’s divergence from other constitutional
legal systems, known as the question of American exceptionalism.21
The more exceptional American constitutional law is, the harder it is to
compare it to other constitutional legal systems or to borrow from them.
American exceptionalism can be divided into substantive exceptionalism
and methodological exceptionalism.22 In terms of substantive exceptionalism,
commentators have addressed the unique priority given to free speech in
American constitutional law, as well as the strong separation of state and
religion and the particular U.S. commitment to what has been termed
“the twin instruments of death”: guns and capital punishment.23 From
the perspective of methodology under the exceptionalist view, American
constitutional law tends to be categorical rather than openended and
standard-like; the constitutional analysis is conducted in its entirety in a
single stage of identifying whether a constitutional right has been infringed
or which category applies to the given case.24 European constitutional
Travesty Time, Again: In Its Death-Penalty Decision, the Supreme Court Hits a New
Low, NAT’L REV., Mar. 28, 2005, at 17, 18 (criticizing the Court’s reference to foreign
law, which “in tacit coordination with foreign courts, is moving toward a global bill of
rights”).
20. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 138–40, 143 (2005) (advocating a cosmopolitical position that supports
reliance on foreign law).
21. The term “American exceptionalism” can be traced back to ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 455–56 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835). The literature on American exceptionalism is vast. See,
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006);
Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Harold
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (2003);
Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United
States: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND US
CONSTITUTIONALISM 49, 49–51 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005).
22. See sources cited infra note 65.
23. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 395–96 (2008). An accessible review of major
aspects of American substantive exceptionalism was provided in a series of articles
published recently in The New York Times. The New York Times, American Exception,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/us/series/american_exception/index.html (last visited
May 31, 2009). The series, written by Adam Liptak between October 17, 2007, and
September 18, 2008, is entitled American Exception and sets out to “examine
commonplace aspects of the American justice system that are virtually unique in the
world.” Id.
24. Schauer, supra note 21, at 68; Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules
and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 308–09 (2003); Frederick Schauer, The
Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
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law, in contrast, is depicted as more standard-like and as a two-stage
analysis. The first stage is the identification of an infringement, while in
the second stage, the government tries to justify the infringement by
showing that it was pursuing a legitimate governmental end using
proportional governmental means.25 Opponents of the exceptionalist
view argue that differences between the United States and other legal
systems are overestimated and that American exceptionalism is, to a
large extent, a myth: Focusing their criticism on the methodological
prong of the exceptionalist approach,26 opponents stress that U.S.
constitutionalism is facing the same generic problems and using roughly
the same set of doctrines as the rest of the legal world.27
In the Supreme Court, two of the major participants in both of these
debates have been Justice Breyer, who argues for the use of foreign law
and, implicitly, against the exceptionalist view, and Justice Scalia, who
criticizes a resort to foreign law and advocates exceptionalism.28 The

supra note 21, at 29, 32 [hereinafter Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment]. In
addition, see also Mattias Kumm & Víctor Ferreres Comella, What Is So Special About
Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation? A Comparative Analysis of the Function of
State Action Requirements and Indirect Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 241, 278, 286 (Andras Sajo &
Renata Uitz eds., 2005). Kumm and Comella state:
It would be false to claim that proportionality analysis and balancing have no
role to play in American constitutional law. They obviously do. Yet it is also
clear that, unlike the courts used as a point of comparison here, the Supreme
Court is more hesitant in its embrace of proportionality analysis and frames
inquiries in a way that appears more legalistic and categorical.
Id. at 278 (footnote omitted).
25. Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 92–98 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
26. Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 425 (“[W]hile I think Fred Schauer is correct that
U.S. free speech jurisprudence is more categorical in this sense, reflecting in part as he
argues an exceptionally strong substantive commitment to free speech protection, it
should not be automatically inferred that this approach applies to other constitutional
rights.”) (footnote omitted).
27. See, e.g., BEATTY, supra note 4, at 2–5; Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting
Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 853 (2007); Gardbaum, supra note 23, at
411–16; Law, supra note 4, at 659–60.
28. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg have sided with Breyer in the
debate. For O’Connor’s position, see Sandra Day O’Connor, Commentary, Broadening
Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW.,
Sept. 1998, at 20, 20–21. See also O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons,
stating that “this Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other
countries.” 543 U.S. 551, 605 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Additionally, see
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The
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foreign law debate seems to have begun in the Printz decision in 1997:
Justice Breyer’s reference to comparative constitutional law to determine
whether a federal statute violated American federalism aroused fierce
criticism from Justice Scalia.29 Between 2002 and 2005, the foreign law
debate intensified as the Court addressed such major issues as capital
punishment for the mentally disabled,30 the constitutionality of sodomy
laws,31 affirmative action in college admission,32 and the applicability of
the death penalty to juvenile offenders.33
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been no major decision referring to
foreign law since Roper was decided in 2005. The Heller case presented
what seemed like the ideal context in which the debate would reappear:
like Lawrence and Roper before it, Heller also involved an issue for
which the American constitutional approach diverged dramatically from
that taken by other systems. The precedence given to the right to bear
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 351, 355 (2005) (“The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of
the United States in grappling with hard questions has a certain kinship to the view that
the U.S. Constitution is a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its
ratification.”). In addition, see the characterization of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Roper. Jackson, supra note 17, at 115 (referring to Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, and stating
that for Justice Kennedy, “foreign law, practice, and reasoning—though not
‘controlling’—helped to confirm the Court’s judgment based on the weight of state
practices and its view of the moral capacities of adolescents”). Justice Breyer endorsed
references to foreign law in The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S.
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 523–24, 537 (2005). Moreover, see Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s position in William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD
OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at vii, viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet
eds., 2002), stating that “it’s time the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.” Id. at viii. Justice Scalia
is the most vocal opponent of the introduction of foreign law into American
constitutional law. In Roper, he stated that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—
that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be
rejected out of hand.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Thomas, who joined Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Roper, and Chief Justice Roberts,
who indicated his opposition to the Court’s reference to foreign law in his confirmation
hearings, both sided with Justice Scalia on this point. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 607;
Transcript: Second Day of Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Roberts, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/13text-roberts.
html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (presenting Chief Justice Roberts’s testimony at his
confirmation hearings, in which he stated that “looking at foreign law for support is like
looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends”).
29. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (presenting Justice
Scalia’s criticism that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting
a constitution”).
30. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21.
31. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
32. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003).
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
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arms in the Constitution and American culture is unique.34 The special
status given to this right fits nicely with the conservatism that characterizes
many of those arguing for American exceptionalism. It could, therefore,
be expected that Justice Breyer would support gun control and, moreover,
would turn to foreign law to support this view by showing a consensus
among other nations on the constitutionality of gun control. Similarly,
Justice Scalia could be expected to fiercely object to gun control and to
reject any reference to foreign law. However, no reference to foreign law
was made, and thus, no debate over the validity of its use ensued.
Indeed, at first glance, Heller seems to be an entirely internal American
law debate.
A. The Heller Decision
In Heller, the Supreme Court struck down a District of Columbia law
that drastically limited the ability of its residents to possess handguns.35
The majority opinion, which regarded the right to bear arms as an
individual and not a collective right, concluded that the law was
unconstitutional.36 The majority opinion revolved almost entirely
around the matter of the original meaning of the Second Amendment at
the time of its ratification, arguing that it had included an understanding
of the right to bear arms as an individual right.37 Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion also focused on original meaning but argued for the
opposite understanding.38
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the test that would be
applied for the application of the right, regardless of whether it should be
understood as an individual or collective right.39 This test, he maintained,
would necessarily entail the balancing of the right against the governmental
interests underlying the given statute.40 This analysis, according to Breyer,
would weigh four questions:

34. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 407 (“[T]he United States is distinguished
from other Western countries, where gun ownership is comparatively rare and tends not
to be a subject that triggers—excuse the pun—the emotions.”).
35. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).
36. Id. at 2797, 2821–22.
37. Id. at 2788–812.
38. Id. at 2822–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
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[H]ow the statute seeks to further the governmental interests that it serves, how
the statute burdens the interests that the Second Amendment seeks to protect,
and whether there are practical less burdensome ways of furthering those
interests. The ultimate question is whether the statute imposes burdens that, when
viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.41

In response to Justice Breyer’s position, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion rejected such a balancing test for watering down constitutional
rights. He stated, “The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands
of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon.”42 Furthermore, Scalia accused judges who use balancing of
illegitimately supplementing the words of the Constitution with their
views on the proper balance between rights and interests. Breyer’s
balancing, according to Scalia, was no more than “a judge-empowering
‘interest-balancing inquiry.’”43
Justice Breyer responded to Scalia’s accusations by asserting that “the
very nature of the [balancing] approach—requiring careful identification
of the relevant interests and evaluating the law’s effect upon them—
limits the judge’s choices.”44 Moreover, Breyer argued that his balancing
method’s “necessary transparency lays bare the judge’s reasoning for all
to see and to criticize.”45 Finally, Breyer stated that “[c]ontrary to the
majority’s unsupported suggestion that this sort of ‘proportionality’
approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied it in various
constitutional contexts.”46
B. Foreign Law in Heller: The Proportionality Approach
From the above exchange between Justices Breyer and Scalia, the
debate appears to revolve solely around an internal matter of American
law, seemingly echoing the age-old, uniquely American controversy
over standards versus rules and balancing versus categorization.47
41. Id. at 2854.
42. Id. at 2821 (majority opinion).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2852 (citation omitted).
47. The debate between balancing and categorization has been especially strong in
free speech jurisprudence. The first round of this debate took place in the early 1960s.
See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1449
(1962) (arguing against balancing in First Amendment jurisprudence); Wallace Mendelson,
The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV.
479, 481 (1964) (endorsing balancing in First Amendment jurisprudence). The debate is
still very much alive today. Although in the 1970s and early 1980s it disappeared
somewhat, the debate has come to life again in recent years. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737,
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However, the reference to proportionality in Breyer’s dissent should
immediately catch the attention of anyone versed in European and global
constitutional law. This marked the first time that proportionality was
used as a term of art in Supreme Court case law. Other usages of the
term have been in the context of punishment, in which it bears an
entirely different meaning, or in the ordinary spoken sense in referring
to something as “disproportionate” or “proportionate.”48 But, unlike the
latter usages of the word or its derivatives in case law, Justice Breyer set
the word in inverted commas and described it as an approach, thereby
making it clear that the word was being used as a term of art.49
Moreover, interestingly enough, Breyer attributed the original mention
of proportionality to the majority opinion, in which it actually does not
appear, when he referred to “the majority’s unsupported suggestion that
this sort of ‘proportionality’ approach is unprecedented.”50 Breyer cited
specific pages in the majority opinion, but the closest that any of the
passages on those pages comes to what Breyer referred to is Justice
Scalia’s statement, “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interestbalancing’ approach.”51 In rephrasing this passage, Breyer exchanged the

738 (2002) (endorsing balancing in First Amendment analysis); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 770 (2001) (arguing against balancing in
the context of the First Amendment). The debate also extended to constitutional law
generally. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 59 (1992) (describing the debate on the Court as between
probalancing Justices and procategorization Justices). For a recent account of the rules
versus standards debate, see Frederick Schauer, supra note 24, at 305. The debate traces
back to Justice Holmes’s pro-“standards” position in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, see O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458
(1897), versus Hart’s pro-“rules” position, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80
(2d ed. 1994).
48. As noted by Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 427 n.171, reference to
proportionality exists in America in the dormant commerce clause “balancing test” and
in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—“is Congress’s measure so disproportionate
to any state violations as to go beyond remedy or prevention into ‘substantive’
regulation?” Id. In the context of rights, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected
proportionality as part of the test for “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth
Amendment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
49. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2821 (majority opinion).
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phrase “interest-balancing” for “proportionality.”52 Putting proportionality in
quotation marks, labeling it an approach, and replacing the majority’s
words are clear indicators of Breyer’s conscious and intentional decision
to incorporate the proportionality approach—the well-known European
doctrine of proportionality—into his dissenting opinion.
Arguably, Justice Breyer was aware that most people would not notice
his reference to European proportionality. Indeed, Justice Scalia apparently
missed it, for he would have otherwise most likely responded to this, as
he did to almost every other part of the Breyer dissent. In fact, it appears
that this reference has escaped the attention of most of the commentators
on Heller to date as well. But, even if Breyer’s invocation of proportionality
initially went unnoticed, at a later stage, Breyer or any other Justice could
refer back to the passage as support for the stance that the so-called
proportionality approach is not without precedent in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Breyer thus furthered the attempt to lay the groundwork
for the Court’s adoption, or at least recognition, of the doctrine of
proportionality.
Proportionality analysis usually proceeds in three stages after a
legitimate governmental end has been shown to underlie the act
infringing the given constitutional right. First, the means applied must
further this end; second, the government must show that it chose the
least restrictive means to further that end; and third, the benefits of
achieving the sought after objective must be proportionate—in a strict
sense—to the extent of violation of the given right. This proportionality
model has been embraced by judges in almost every Western jurisdiction
outside of the United States, becoming one of the clearest features of
global constitutionalism.53 The model’s appeal is most likely attributable to
its clear and systematic analytical formation, its combined flexibility and
structure, and its seeming ability to capture the generic features of rights
jurisprudence—including both means-ends analysis and balancing.
Starting in the 1970s, proportionality began to spread through the
Western world. The weighty influence of German constitutional law, which
applied the doctrine, led to its incorporation first into the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights54 and the European Court of
52. Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Proportionality analysis is a central feature of what Weinrib calls “the postwar
paradigm.” Weinrib, supra note 25, at 84; see also sources cited supra note 4
(explaining the proliferation of the proportionality paradigm).
54. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfaf7d.html; Handyside v. United Kingdom,
24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6b6fb8.html. See generally Marc-André Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 126–31 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
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Justice,55 and then in 1986, it traveled to Canada.56 This process sped up
in the 1990s, at which time proportionality was adopted in almost every
European country, as well as in many countries outside Europe. Today,
proportionality is an accepted doctrine in Ireland,57 South Africa,58 Israel,59
Australia,60 New Zealand,61 and many more countries.62 It seems that
the United States is the last system in the West to resist the appeal of the
proportionality doctrine.63
Justice Breyer is likely well aware of these developments in global
constitutional law and of the centrality of proportionality in other legal
systems. Breyer is one of the leading American Justices in the field of
comparative constitutional law and is an ambassador of sorts for the
Supreme Court in other countries. Speaking fluent French, he appears
regularly at international gatherings of jurists and international
conferences, all of which include a fair share of proportionality analysis.64
Ultimately, Breyer’s deep knowledge of comparative constitutional law,
and his specific acquaintance with the doctrine of proportionality and the
55. Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, 1685–87.
56. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135–42 (Can.).
57. Blascaod Mor Teoranta v. Comm’rs of Pub. Works, [1998] I.E.H.C. 38, ¶¶ 49–
64 (27th February, 1998) (H.Ct.) (Ir.) available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases
/IEHC/1998/38.html (last visited May 31, 2009).
58. S v Zuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) (S. Afr.).
59. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC
49(4) 221, 280–85, 325–31.
60. Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 152 A.L.R. 540 (Austl.).
61. Ministry of Transp. v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260, 282–85 (C.A.).
62. For Brazil, see Alonso Reis Freire, Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation
in Brazil and the Employment of Balancing “Method” by Brazilian Supreme Court in
Judicial Review 7–11 (n.d.) (unpublished conference paper, on file with author),
available at http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w15/Paper%20by%20Prof%20Alonso%20Reis
%20Freire.pdf. For Korea, see JEON Hak-Seon, L’application du principe de
proportionnalité dans la Justice constitutionnelle en Corée (n.d.) (unpublished conference
paper, on file with author), available at http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w15/Paper%20by
%20Prof.%20JEON%20Hak-Seon.pdf. Both papers were presented at the VIIth World
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law.
63. Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 424 (proposing if “U.S. courts engage in secondstep analysis at all, they reject the near-universal proportionality test in favor of the more
categorical, rule-like, fixed tiers or standards of review”); see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on
“Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 603 (1999) (“U.S.
constitutional law does not ordinarily and explicitly resort to the idea of proportionality
as a measure of constitutionality.”).
64. See Salzburg Global Seminar, supra note 6; see also Richard A. Posner,
Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1715 (2006) (noting the
fact that Justice Breyer is fluent in French).
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extent of its influence in Europe and elsewhere, further indicates that his
reference to proportionality in Heller was not mere coincidence.
Justice Breyer’s reference to foreign constitutional law in Heller is
novel and unique in two ways. First, for what appears to be the first time in
the ongoing foreign law debate, a foreign methodology or doctrine—and
not foreign substantive ideas or solutions—was invoked.65 Because
proportionality does not include any substantive commitments and instead
provides only an analytical framework for rights adjudication,66 Breyer’s
foreign law reference in Heller stands in sharp contrast to the Roper,
Atkins, Lawrence, and Grutter decisions in which the Justices who invoked
foreign law did so in order to bolster their substantive conclusions
regarding the interpretation of the Constitution.67 In particular, foreign
law was invoked in both Roper and Lawrence as proof of consensus
among members of the international community regarding standards of
morality, which can constitute prima facie justification for the recognition
of those standards by the Supreme Court.68
There are at least two advantages to this shift in strategy from substance
to methodology. First, unlike substantive commitments, methodology
seems more neutral and technical and therefore attracts less attention and
criticism. Second, an imported methodological framework might prove to
be even more effective than imported substantive ideas in terms of
Supreme Court recognition of foreign law. A shared methodology better
facilitates dialogue in future cases and could lay the foundation for the
introduction of substantive ideas in the future. Indeed, the reluctance of
the American judiciary to adopt proportionality analysis is an obstacle to
constitutional dialogue with other legal systems. Justice Breyer therefore
laid the groundwork for smoother dialogue with other countries. Indeed,
the incorporation of proportionality into legal systems has often coincided
with an intensified engagement in comparative constitutional law.
The second facet of the Heller reference to foreign law that
distinguishes it from others is the fact that it is covert rather than overt.
Justice Breyer did not directly invoke foreign constitutional law, and his
65. For a distinction between methodological and substantive forms of American
exceptionalism, see Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 422–24, and Schauer, The Exceptional
First Amendment, supra note 24, at 30.
66. See, for example, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.), in which
Canadian Chief Justice Dickson remarks:
The analytical framework of Oakes [that is, proportionality analysis] has been
continually reaffirmed by this Court, yet it is dangerously misleading to conceive
of s. 1 as a rigid and technical provision, offering nothing more than a last chance
for the state to justify incursions into the realm of fundamental rights.
Id. at 735.
67. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 31, 33.
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opinion cited no foreign sources.69 Moreover, in two separate parts of
his opinion, he made a point of stressing that his analysis rested firmly
on prevailing American constitutional jurisprudence.70 This seems a
clear attempt to use the term and the doctrine of proportionality without
being explicit about their source. Breyer thus circumvented the criticism
that usually ensues after open reliance on foreign norms, as well as the
accompanying legitimacy problems. Under this approach, foreign ideas
are attributed with American credentials and gain legitimacy by being
presented as a natural development of American constitutional law.
Justice Breyer’s approach was not, in fact, a novel strategy for
incorporating foreign law into domestic constitutional law, or even for
specifically incorporating the doctrine of proportionality. Indeed, in the
landmark Oakes decision, which introduced proportionality into Canadian
constitutional law, Chief Justice Dickson presented the doctrine as an
internal Canadian constitutional legal development and as the product of
interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights; he made no
reference to European constitutional law, which has almost exactly the
same structure of proportionality.71
Justice Breyer’s awareness of the advantages inherent in covertly
referencing foreign law possibly arose during a televised debate with
Justice Scalia in January 2005, three years before the Heller decision. In
discussing reliance upon foreign law in American jurisprudence, Scalia
said to Breyer, “Look, I’m not preventing you from reading these
[foreign law] cases. . . . I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity! Just
don’t put it in your opinions!”72 In Heller, then, Breyer was simply adopting
69. The only reference to foreign law was in the context of checking the
correlation between gun control laws and murder rates. See District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2858 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]espondent’s amici
point to a statistical analysis that regresses murder rates against the presence or absence
of strict gun laws in 20 European nations.”); see also Brief of Criminologists et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 383535 (citing Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser,
Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?: A Review of International and
Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 651–94 (2007)).
70. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847–48, 2850–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136–37 (Can.). In addition, Grimm, supra
note 4, 383–84, raises the question of whether Chief Justice Dickson, in writing the
Oakes decision, had been guided by foreign examples or had in fact developed the test
completely on his own. Grimm then notes that “[t]he German and Canadian
proportionality tests differ slightly in their terminology.” Id. at 384.
72. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 28,
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the advice of his fellow Justice and keeping the debate behind the
scenes. The Court’s shift towards covert reference to foreign law also
accords with what seems to be its general backing down from references
to foreign legal materials. This retreat from openly referring to foreign
sources, which is most likely due to the criticism it attracts, is evidenced
by the fact that the Court has not referred to any foreign legal materials
since the Roper case, despite having some fitting opportunities to do
so.73
There are, however, obvious disadvantages to covert use of foreign
law. One is that the lack of transparency prevents debate and discussion
regarding the merits of using the given norm. The rest of the discussion
in this Article is thus devoted to a consideration of how the debate would
have transpired among the Justices had Breyer made explicit mention of
European proportionality. The aim will be to take a closer look at the
Breyer claim that the Supreme Court has applied the proportionality
approach “in various constitutional contexts.”74 Indeed, the hypothetical
debate likely would have addressed the questions of precisely what
adopting proportionality would entail, and how big an impact it would
have on prevailing American constitutional law. In considering these
questions, this Article compares European proportionality with American
balancing and ultimately finds support for Breyer’s claim on the doctrinal
level, but difficulties in the broader context.
III. INTRINSIC BALANCING AND BOUNDED BALANCING
This section addresses the question of whether the general doctrinal
constructs of European proportionality can be found in American
constitutional law and concludes that, at least on the doctrinal level,

at 534. There is another passage in the same televised debate that illustrates a very
similar point. Justice Breyer, in recounting a conversation that he had with a congressman,
stated:
I said to the congressman, “If I have a difficult case and a human being called
a judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar problem,
why should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind me, but I may
learn something.” The congressman replied, “Fine. You are right. Read it.
Just don’t cite it in your opinion.”
Id. at 522.
73. One such obvious opportunity to cite foreign legal materials was Kennedy v.
Louisiana, which ruled that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for the
crime of raping a child. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2675–77 (2008). The decision turned over the
same legal questions that were posed in the Roper case—determining the evolving
standards of morality regarding the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause—yet, unlike his decision in Roper, Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority
opinion, did not cite to any foreign legal material.
74. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer might have had a valid point in Heller.75 However, taking into
account the historical, cultural, and institutional characteristics of America
and Europe, balancing and proportionality are situated in significantly
different ways.
A. Balancing and Proportionality: Doctrinal Similarities
and Beyond
Conceptually, balancing and proportionality seem to be distinct
doctrines with different connotations. Proportionality seems to set out
by first considering one object and then asking whether another object is
proportional to that first object. Balancing, in contrast, seems to lack
any similar sense of a starting point; rather, it compares two objects
without according any preference to either one.76 However, this conceptual
difference is of minor practical import because the two doctrines involve
very similar thought processes: both assess the extent of rights
infringement and the relative necessity of the infringement for realizing
state interests.
As with European proportionality, in American constitutional law,
balancing the comparative importance of the infringed right with the
governmental interests comes after conducting the tests to filter out
superfluous government means. In American law, these tests—which
comprise the first and second prongs of European proportionality—are
conglomerated into the well-known least restrictive means test, which is
associated with balancing. Recall that there are three stages to
proportionality: the first two stages—rational connection and least
restrictive means—entail a means-ends analysis, while the third step is a
balancing test that contemplates proportionality in its strict sense—
balancing the benefits against the costs. Arguably, all three stages of the
proportionality analysis exist in American constitutional law. As to the
first two stages of proportionality, which concern means-end analyses,
they exist explicitly in the well-known levels of scrutiny tests, which are
75. Although this Article sides with a revisionist approach regarding the difference
in terms of one-step analysis versus two-step analysis, this support is limited to the
specific context of this aspect; it does not extend to other structural and nonsubstantive
differences. For example, Part II argues that there is a strong difference between the
American and European constitutional systems in terms of positive versus negative
rights and the application of constitutional rights in the private sphere.
76. For an overview of the use of the scales metaphor, see Dennis E. Curtis &
Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1741 n.32 (1987).
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applied in different degrees of rigorousness in American constitutional
law. Basically, the same two questions that proportionality weighs are
being asked in the American tests as well: whether the means taken by
the government further a governmental end, and whether they are the
least restrictive means by which the government can pursue that goal.77
The balancing test that is the third stage of proportionality is present
both implicitly in the least restrictive means requirement and explicitly
in many different direct applications of balancing,78 which occur in
contexts ranging from low-level speech, to the commerce clause, to due
process.79
Notwithstanding these similarities between European and American
legal analysis, proportionality is arguably unique in that it consolidates
the aforementioned analytical elements in an orderly and consecutive
manner under the umbrella of one doctrine. If this is indeed the case,
Justice Breyer’s introduction of proportionality is no more than an
ordering and organizing of preexisting components of American
constitutional law. Thus, although an undeniably important move in
itself, Breyer’s approach does not amount to creating something new,
and instead supports a general argument, such as that made by David
Law, that a generic constitutional law structure exists in every constitutional
system, including American constitutional law.80
Therefore, at the doctrinal level, Justice Breyer and critics of
American exceptionalism are correct in claiming that the proportionality
approach is at least latently present in American constitutional law. The
doctrinal level, however, does not paint the entire picture. There are real
differences in the ways these similar doctrines function and in the
meanings they are assigned, as well as in the respective attitudes towards
them in America and elsewhere. This conclusion accords with several
comparative scholars who have argued for a more contextual approach
in comparative constitutional law. Mark Tushnet and Pierre Legrand,
amongst others, have strongly advocated for such contextualism,

77. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1336
(2007).
78. Id. at 1306–08; Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle
and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1463–64 (1967); Note, Less
Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468 (1969).
79. Aleinikoff, supra note 47, at 963–67 (documenting the spread of balancing in
American constitutional law); see also Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t
Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007) (discussing
the use of balancing in affirmative action cases).
80. Law, supra note 4, at 659.
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warning against facile comparisons that do not take into account deeper
constructs of cultures, institutions, and attitudes.81
In another essay, we addressed the historical differences between
balancing and proportionality. A comparative historical account of the
different purposes and ends of balancing in American constitutional law
and proportionality in European constitutional law suggests that proportionality
was used in nineteenth-century Germany to introduce rights into a system
lacking constitutional protections, whereas balancing was developed in the
United States in the early twentieth century to limit rights accorded
absolute protection by the Lochner Court.82 This Article presents a
related account of the development of the two doctrines, emphasizing
political culture and the respective conceptions of the polity in the two
systems. This account reveals that proportionality in Germany is based
on an organic conception of the state and operates to moderate and
navigate the realization of commonly shared social values and interests.
In the United States, greater public suspicion of the Court and government
has led to a more minor and subsidiary role for balancing, bounded by a
more categorical approach towards rights. Balancing in America is
instrumental in smoking out illicit motives, serves as proxy for a categorical
approach, and when true balancing does take place, is subsidiary and
applied in a pragmatic fashion. Thus, German proportionality and the
American doctrine of balancing represent two types of balancing: the
latter the bounded sense of balancing and the former intrinsic balancing.
B. The Intrinsic Sense of Balancing in Germany
This Article focuses on Germany as reflecting European proportionality
for two reasons. The first and more obvious reason is that Germany is

81. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 55–60 (1996); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1300 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections
on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAS, supra note 25, at 67, 81 (arguing for a combination of the universal and
contextual approaches in comparative constitutional law; the universal approach allows
us to understand which of the legal arrangements constitute a false necessity, whereas the
contextual approach reminds us that constitutional law is deeply embedded in the
cultural, doctrinal, and social contexts of each country).
82. Iddo Porat & Moshe Cohen-Eliya, American Balancing and German
Proportionality: The Historical Origins 13, 26 (Sept. 23, 2008) (unpublished paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272763.
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where the doctrine originated.83 The second reason is the tremendous
influence of German constitutional law in general and its application of
proportionality in particular, due to the fact that decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court are cited in the decisions of many other legal
systems across the globe.84 The German conception of balancing revolves
around intrinsic values. Balancing expresses values of compromise,
mediation, and pluralism. This intrinsic sense of balancing is tied to an
organic conception of the state, under which all organs trust one another
and cooperate to realize common values that express the spirit of the
nation.
1. The German Organic Conception of the State
The terrible outcome of the Second World War ignited a debate over
the political morality that should guide the constitution of the new
Germany. In his seminal work The German Idea of Freedom, Leonard
Krieger argued that in light of the moral bankruptcy of nationalism,
Germany should depart from its communitarian heritage and adopt a
more neutral, suspicion-based constitution, one that guaranteed negative
liberties for all its citizens and set strict limits on the government.85
83. The first reference to proportionality can be found in the Allgemeines
Landrecht, the Prussian General Code of 1794, which authorized the government to
exercise police powers in order to ensure public order, but at the same time also limited
those powers to such measures that are essential for achieving that goal. The pertinent
section stated that “the police is to take the necessary measures for the maintenance of
public peace, security and order.” ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUßISCHEN
STAATEN VON 1794 [PRUSSIAN GENERAL CODE], pt. II, tit. 17, § 10, translated in Stone
Sweet & Mathews, supra note 4, at 101 (emphasis added). The principle of
proportionality was developed in the writings of nineteenth-century German
constitutional scholars and became judicial doctrine in the Prussian Supreme
Administrative Court (1882–1941). See Kenneth F. Ledford, Formalizing the Rule of
Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876–1914, 37 CENT. EUR.
HIST. 203, 222 (2004); see also Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 4, at 97–111
(providing discussions on Germany).
84. Jeffrey B. Hall, Taking “Rechts” Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, 9 GERMAN L.J. 771, 771 (2008), http://www.
germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No06/PDF_Vol_09_No_06_771-98_Articles_Hall.pdf
(“Over the past 60 years the German Basic Law has become one of the most influential
constitutional systems in the world.”). Hall makes reference to Juliane Kokott, From
Reception and Transplantation to Convergence of Constitutional Models in the Age of
Globalization—with Special Reference to the German Basic Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
UNIVERSALISM, AND DEMOCRACY—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 71 (Christian Starck ed.,
1999), which catalogs and analyzes the extensive reception of the German Basic Law in
constitutions throughout the world, and Donald P. Kommers, Germany: Balancing
Rights and Duties, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 161, 161–
62, 201–02 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
85. LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM 470 (1957) (arguing for a
position that “views the state as a morally neutral, purely utilitarian organization of
public power”); see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
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Although sound at first glance, it appears that this “American-style”
solution of state neutrality and negative rights was inappropriate for
post-World War II Germany. First, adhering to state neutrality would
also entail neutrality towards the racist attitudes that were prevalent in a
society in which the large majority of the population was raised on the
value of Aryan superiority. Indeed, an ambitious project lay behind the
formulation of the postwar German constitution: the goal was to bring
about a profound transformation of German consciousness and attitudes
such that the values upon which human rights are based would become
acknowledged and internalized.86 This aim could only be realized by
according the state a nonneutral stance in society. Secondly, the “neutral”
approach does not conform to traditional German political theory, which
is Hegelian and Aristotelian in orientation. Under this tradition, the state
is not conceived as merely an aggregate of individuals who live in a
given territory and coordinate their activities by means of the state, but
instead as a union of people who have a shared system of values and
endeavor to promote them.87 Rather than the atomized conception of the

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 33 (2d ed. 1997); Girish N. Bhat, Recovering the
Historical Rechtsstaat, 32 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 65, 88–89 (2007).
86. See Clemens Jabloner, Hans Kelsen: Introduction, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE
OF CRISIS 67, 73 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper et al.
trans., 2000) (arguing that the concepts of formal democracy and neutrality that guided
the Weimar Republic were reasons for its constitutional collapse); Donald P. Kommers,
German Constitutionalism: A Prolegemenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 852–53, 861 (1991)
(explaining that the trauma of the Second World War has led many German theorists to
suggest a departure from neutral principles of formalism and to adopt a natural law
approach).
87. The German fundamental concept of the Rechtsstaat—“a state governed by
law”—differs from the common law concept of rule of law, in that it is tied to an organic
conception of the state that seeks to integrate state and society. See KOMMERS, supra
note 85, at 36; HANS ROSENBERG, POLITISCHE DENKSTRÖMUNGEN IM DEUTCHEN
VORMÄRZ 37 (1972) (arguing that the state is viewed not only as an institutional
safeguard to protect individual rights, but also as “Vaterland”); RUDOLF SMEND,
VERFASSUNG UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT (1928) (stating the role of the constitution and of
constitutional interpretation is to integrate society around shared values); OTTO VON
GIERKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY (Bernard Freyd trans., Howard Fertig,
Inc. 1966) (1939) (original German version appeared in 1880); Mathias Reimann,
Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990) (discussing the
influence of Hegelian and communitarian ideas on nineteenth-century German legal
science). On Smend’s influential integration theory, see also Stefan Korioth, Rudolph
Smend: Introduction, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS, supra note 86, at 207.
THE
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self, the German political theory of the “separateness of the person”88
emphasizes that a person is embedded in a community that shares
common values and expresses solidarity towards all members of that
community. Accordingly, in 1954, the Federal German Constitutional
Court (FGCC) ruled that:
The Basic Law’s idea of man is not the idea of an isolated sovereign individual;
rather, the Basic Law has decided the tension between individuals and society in
favor of the individual being community related and community bound—while
not touching its intrinsic value.89

State organs therefore play an important role in realizing common
values. Naturally, such an organic conception of the state is trustoriented: It is constructed on a premise of reciprocal cooperation and
trust amongst all state organs and assumes that all state organs have
legitimate interests that should be optimized. The functioning of the
FGCC should be understood in light of this organic conception. Unlike
the U.S. perception of courts, constitutional judges in Germany are not
expected to fulfill a classic antimajoritarian task. As Alec Stone Sweet
explains, in Germany, as in Europe in general, the Constitutional Court
does not conduct judicial review in the typical antimajoritarian sense that
many Europeans oppose. Instead, the court is viewed as a political
organ that constitutes an integral part of the state and shares with the
state the task of elaborating and shaping social values and norms.90 This
conception of the court’s role, which reflects and derives from the
organic approach to the state, may account for the fact that, in Germany,
there is much less criticism of judicial review for being countermajoritarian.91

88. The concept of the separateness of the person is central in liberalism and in
libertarianism. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32–33 (1974); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971).
89. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 20,
1954, 4 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 7 (¶¶ 15–16)
(F.R.G.) (author’s translation), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv004007.html.
90. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE 32, 40 (2000).
91. It is true that, in the 1960s, there was some criticism of the broad role of the
court and its extensive reference to abstract values. Carl Schmitt and other German legal
scholars have attacked the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it leads to the
“tyranny of values” (“die tyrannei der werte”), primarily because values are of an
abstract nature and their realization quite often leads to rulings that are in accordance
with the particular judge’s own personal value system. See E RNST F ORSTHOFF , Z UR
P ROBLEMATIK DER V ERFASSUNGSAUSLEGUNG 19, 40 (1961); Carl Schmitt, Die
Tyrannei der Werte, in SÄKULARISATION UND UTOPIE: ERNST FORSTHOFF ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 37, 39 (K. Doering & W.G. Greve eds., 1967); Wolfgang Zeidler, Grundrechte
und Grundentscheidungen der Verfassung im Widerstreit, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES
DREIUNDFÜNFZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 6, 6–29 (1980). This criticism, however,
represents the minority stance in current German legal scholarship. See Kommers, supra
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As Dieter Grimm has put it, “There is no preestablished difference
between court and legislatures which a particular contribution has to
adopt and which an interpreter has to enforce regardless of what the
constitution says. In addition, constitutional courts inevitably cross the
line between law and politics.”92
Shortly after its establishment, the FGCC ruled that the constitution is
governed by an objective and hierarchal set of values, the so-called
Objective Wertrangordnung.93 This ruling did not mark a departure in
any way from traditional German thought, which assigns the state a
central role in realizing individual well-being and integrating individuals
into a community with shared values. The court did, however, change
the contents of those common values in its ruling. Rather than
nationalistic values—such as Volksgeist, or “the spirit of the people,”
which lay at the foundation of nineteenth-century German jurisprudence94
—the court deemed the dominating value of German society to be
human dignity.95 This value, which now opens the German constitution,
is absolute and constitutes the constitution’s Archimedes Point.96

note 86, at 842 (stating that “the source and authority of the Federal Constitutional Court
are relatively undisputed”).
92. KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 44 (referencing Grimm’s comments that appear in
Dieter Grimm, Comment, in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 169, 169 (Christian Landfried ed., 1988)).
93. Article 117 Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Dec. 18, 1953, 3 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 225
(232) (F.R.G.) (author’s translation), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 47–48 (noting
that the Constitutional Court rejected “value-free legal positivism” and that the Court in
the first years “appeared to accept natural law as an independent standard of review”).
94. Reimann, supra note 87, at 853. To Savigny, one of the leading legal scholars
in nineteenth-century Germany, Volksgeist does not stand for “culture” in the
anthropological sense, but rather in the intellectual sense; Volksgeist was the organic
development of the law’s intellectual underlying principles. Id.
95. Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law, 1949, provides: “Human dignity shall
be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1(1) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundestag.
de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf (English
translation). In the Microsenzus case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] July 16, 1969, 27 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), the FGCC ruled that “[h]uman Dignity is at the very top of the
value order of the Basic Law.” Id. (author’s translation).
96. Kommers, supra note 86, at 855.
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2. Proportionality as an Intrinsic Element of the Organic
Conception of the State
In addition to being closely tied to the German organic conception of
the polity, the doctrine of proportionality is widely conceived as the
main tool by which the organic conception is realized in the
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court. Proportionality in
Germany is not only a conflict-resolving means, but it is also applied to
harmonize and integrate the various state organs around shared values.97
German constitutional scholars do not speak of proportionality in terms
of a pragmatic enterprise involving some sort of cost-benefit analysis.
Rather, they take a more idealistic view of the doctrine, as necessary for
the optimization of values.98 Proportionality thus serves as the primary
methodology for maintaining the integrity and “unity of values” of the
Basic Law.99 As first stated by Konrad Hesse, the late Constitutional
Court justice:
The principle of the constitution’s unity requires the optimization of [values in
conflict]: Both legal values need to be limited so that each can attain its optimal
effect. In each concrete case, therefore, the limitation must satisfy the principle
of proportionality; that is, they may not go any further than necessary to
produce a concordance of both legal values.100

Proportionality, which is also closely related to the principle requiring
harmonic interpretation of the German constitution, or “praktische
Korkordanz,”101 thus functions as a central mechanism for enhancing
harmony and cooperation between conflicting values in the German
society. The fact that proportionality serves to ensure the realization of
abstract constitutional values and makes them meaningful in concrete
cases traces back to the German conception of value order. Conflicts in
Germany are perceived as transpiring entirely within the constitutional
sphere—both interests and rights derive from the constitution. The main
concern of proportionality, then, is to determine which of the interests or

97.
98.

GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR 94, 95 (Michael Sachs ed., 1996).
See KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 46–47; KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTCHLAND 27 (1988), translated in
Kommers, supra note 86, at 851 n.43.
99. In the Southwest State case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 14 (F.R.G.), the court first set the “unity of values” principle and held that
“every constitutional provision must always be interpreted in such a way as to render it
compatible with the fundamental principles of the constitution.” Id. (author’s translation).
100. HESSE, supra note 98, at 27, quoted and translated in KOMMERS, supra note
85, at 46.
101. Id. at 30–31.
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rights in conflict best further the ultimate shared goals of the
constitutional order. In addition, as noted, the organic conception of the
polity makes the policymaking aspects of proportionality less problematic
in the German constitutional regime, and it is the Constitutional Court’s
manifest task to instantiate the abstract values of the constitution in
particular cases. Thus, rather than being perceived as illegitimate judicial
intervention in policymaking, balancing is viewed in Germany, and
elsewhere on the Continent, as the objective, systematic, and logical
implementation of constitutional rights, while realizing values in everyday
life is considered to be the quintessential task of the court.102
The centrality of the doctrine of proportionality in Constitutional
Court jurisprudence is evidenced clearly in its ruling that proportionality
emerges “basically from the nature of constitutional rights themselves.”103
Indeed, Robert Alexy has gone so far as to assert that proportionality
“logically follows from the nature of [rights as] principles; it can be
deduced from them.”104 Thus, the doctrine of proportionality is understood
in Germany as inherent to the constitution, despite the absence of any
explicit reference to it therein.105
Two Constitutional Court cases are illustrative of how proportionality
analysis operates in light of the organic conception of the state. In
Mephisto, the court dealt with the constitutionality of a judicial order
banning the distribution of Klaus Mann’s Mephisto, on the grounds that
it slandered the reputation of a deceased Nazi collaborator.106 In

102. Jacco Bomhoff, Lüth’s 50th Anniversary: Some Comparative Observations on
the German Foundations of Judicial Balancing, 9 GERMAN L.J. 121, 124 (2008),
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No02/PDF_Vol_09_No_02_121-124_Articles_
Bomhoff.pdf.
103. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15,
1965, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 342 (348) (F.R.G.)
(author’s translation).
104. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66 (Julian Rivers
trans., 2002).
105. In most post-World War II constitutional and international documents, there is
an explicit textual basis for proportionality analysis. See Grimm, supra note 4, at 383–
84 (noting that, in the case of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
“proportionality appears to be a genuine interpretation of the words ‘reasonable limits . . . as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’”). In Germany, however,
the constitutional text lacks such explicit reference. The Constitutional Court derived the
principle of proportionality from the Rechtsstaat but without explaining why. See id. at
385.
106. Mephisto case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 173
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balancing the right to reputation and free artistic speech, the court
deliberated which of the conflicting values had the stronger link to the
paramount value of human dignity.107 The court’s decision in favor of
the right to reputation—and to ban the book’s distribution—meant that
the balancing process more strongly promoted the German value order
that prescribed “man as an autonomous person who develops freely
within the social community.”108
A more nuanced application of proportionality analysis can be found
in the Lebach decision.109 In Lebach, the court addressed the question of
whether a television station could broadcast a documentary exposing the
sexual orientation of a prisoner who was about to be released.110 The
court weighed the extent to which the broadcast would harm the right to
privacy and the extent of harm to free speech that would ensue from
banning the program in light of the paramount value of human
dignity.111 This time, however, the court stressed that it would not
abstractly rank the competing rights.112 Rather, the process of mediation
and harmonization between rights must take place on an ad hoc basis,
with respective extents of harm measured in light of the circumstances
of each given case.113 As a result, the court ruled that banning the
reference to the prisoner’s sexual orientation in the broadcasting would
better realize the supreme value of human dignity.114
Ultimately, it appears that proportionality analysis in Germany has
four distinct intrinsic features. First, primary focus is placed on the
balancing stage—proportionality in its strict sense—rather than on the
identification of the governmental goal or the means-ends analysis.115
Hence, balancing enjoys a central status in German constitutional law.
Second, when conducting balancing analysis, the Constitutional Court
considers which of the competing rights or values better optimizes the
constitutional value order and, more specifically, which one more
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv030173.html, summarized and
partially translated in KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 301–04.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Lebach case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] May 2, 1973, 35 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 202
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv035202.html, summarized and
partially translated in KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 416–19.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Grimm, supra note 4, at 393 (stating that “[t]he most striking difference
between [Canada and Germany] is the high relevance of the third step of the
proportionality test in Germany and its more residual function in Canada”).
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strongly upholds the paramount value of human dignity. Third, German
balancing is always conducted in an ad hoc manner. In Germany, this
does not raise any issue of judicial legitimacy because, under the organic
conception of the state, it is actually the court’s duty to realize these
values in concrete cases. Finally, this German model of intrinsic balancing
presupposes that everything is in the constitution, and that there are no
clear-cut distinctions between rights and interests or a priori preferences
for either.116
C. The Bounded Sense of Balancing in America
Immediate important differences can be identified between German
and American political cultures, which in turn impact the way that
balancing is conceived and applied in America as opposed to the
conception and application of proportionality in Germany. In contrast to
the German organic conception of the state and broad understanding of
rights with no distinction between rights and interests, American
constitutional culture holds a more traditional view of rights as strong
trumps or side constraints vis-à-vis government action. The American
approach, which is the result of the great suspicion with which both
government and the judiciary are regarded, clearly undermines the validity
of balancing in America because balancing erodes the distinctiveness of
rights versus interests and assigns courts broad discretion. Historically,
balancing entered the American legal system through the sphere of
private law, where a clear-cut distinction between rights and interests
was deemed conceptually problematic.117 Balancing only later spread to
constitutional law, where it was initially used mainly to criticize, rather
than bolster, judicial review.118 These shaky beginnings continue to
frame the use of balancing in American constitutional law. Thus, even
as balancing has become a common phenomenon in American jurisprudence,
it is still bounded, so to speak, by the narrow and categorical American
116. Kumm, supra note 4, at 165 (stating that, in Germany, rights are not conceived
of as “trumps” or even “shields”); Julian Rivers, A Theory of Constitutional Rights and
the British Constitution, in A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 104, at
xvii, xxxv–xxxvi (indicating that Alexy’s theory does not differentiate between rights
and interests in that both are subject to the requirement of optimization, that is, to
proportionality analysis).
117. See Porat & Cohen-Eliya, supra note 82, at 20.
118. The concept of balancing was used to criticize judicial review during the
Lochner era. Judicial review during that period was based on a clear separation between
rights and interests, and balancing was used to attack this approach. See id. at 26–27.
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conception of rights, thereby remaining distinct from the intrinsic conception
of balancing in Germany.
1. The Suspicion-Based Conception of the State in America
Four key features of American constitutional law are clearly indicative
of the suspicion-based American approach to the state: (1) the separation
of powers scheme; (2) the conception of rights as trumps; (3) the notion
of neutrality; and (4) the democratic conception of the Constitution.
First, in contrast to the German organic conception of the state, the
American conception of the state is characterized by a well-known
distrust of government, deriving from the idea of individual autonomy
and self-rule.119 This distrust extends to all branches of government,
including the judiciary, and lies at the base of the particularly American
emphasis on separation of powers:120 because no institution can be
trusted not to overstep its legitimate bounds, power must be decentralized
by clearly defining the limits of each branch of government and clearly
separating them.121 Consequently, American constitutional culture focuses
on setting limits on judicial power and distinguishing the judicial role
from the roles of the other branches of government.122 This, of course,
stands in stark contrast to the conception of the German Constitutional
Court as operating between the lines of politics and law.
Second, American constitutionalism is based on the conception of
rights as trumps. The American culture of distrust also bred a suspicionbased approach to drafting the Constitution—clear rules for government
and clear rights for citizens were crafted as a way of limiting
government power. That is, formulating constitutional rights in absolute
terms was preferred to the complexity of allowing limitations on rights
in some instances, and a clear-cut distinction between individual rights
and governmental interests was preferred to blurred boundaries in order
to safeguard individual autonomy and to constrain governmental power.123
119. The most distinct exposition on the centrality of distrust in American political
culture can be found in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 102–03 (1980).
120. See, for example, Rachel Barkow describing the American governmental
system as one “whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers,” in Rachel E.
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1114172.
121. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993)
(explaining the intention of the framers that “[i]n a large republic, the various factions
would offset each other”).
122. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46–47
(1962).
123. C. Edwin Baker, Limitations on Basic Human Rights—A View from the United
States, in THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75,
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Third, diverging from the German conception of underlying values,
the American concept of the polity is based on the Lockean notion of
state neutrality and individual liberties.124 Developed in a historical
period marked by the persecution of religious minorities in Europe,
American constitutionalism seeks to allow maximum freedom for
personal beliefs, and places significant value on allowing multiple and
even conflicting ideologies to coexist within a shared political system.
The Constitution supplies the infrastructure for democracy, but ideas and
ideologies must not be governed or imposed through the Constitution;
they must be hashed out through the democratic process. According to
Justice Holmes, the Constitution should enable people with extremely
divergent views to be united under its umbrella.125
Finally, American constitutional law is based on a deep belief in
representative democracy and the sovereignty of the people. Since Marbury
v. Madison,126 judicial review and the upholding of the Constitution have
been justified by the democratic principle of self-rule.127 That is, the
Constitution represents a particularly long-lasting and fundamental means
of democratic self-legislation; it represents the particular commitments
that the American people undertook and set as higher law. This conception
of democratic self-rule—more so than the organic conception of the
state—views the constitutional text that incorporates these commitments
as of ultimate importance.

76, 89 (Armand de Mestral et al. eds., 1986) (describing the American categorical
approach to rights as opposed to approaches that expressly allow for the limitation of
rights).
124. There is wide consensus on the significant influence of Lockean philosophy on
the American Bill of Rights, though there is dispute as to the centrality of the right to
property—as manifested in Locke’s writings—in the American Constitution. See, e.g.,
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
17, 29 (1985); cf. Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly
Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 14–19 (1987) (questioning the strength
of Locke’s influence on the founding fathers).
125. See Justice Holmes’s famous statement in his dissent for Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905): “[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views.” Id. at 75–76
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
127. See, for example, Jed Rubenfeld arguing that what distinguishes American
constitutionalism is the conception of the Constitution as “the people’s self-given law.”
Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 2000.
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2. The Suspicion-Based Conception of the State and
Bounded Balancing
Whereas under an organic conception of the state balancing is central
to the judicial task of collaborative enhancement of values, it is a
problematic mechanism under a suspicion-based conception. First, the
separation of powers doctrine and public wariness of the courts clash
with balancing because it entails a considerable amount of judicial
discretion, greater, at any rate, than that required by a rule-bound or
categorical approach.128 Moreover, balancing appears to be almost
inseparable from policymaking, which is a function assigned to the
elected branches of government; this further infringes on the idea of
separation of powers.129 Second, balancing also presents a problem from
the perspective of the conception of rights as trumps: obscuring the
distinction between rights and interests and allowing for rights to be
more easily set aside due to state interests result in weaker limits on
government.130 Third, judicial balancing undermines the neutrality value,
for it entails substantive assessments of values by the Court as well as
decisions on the appropriate resolution of conflicts between values. And
finally, balancing tends to prevent textual analysis because balancing is
forward looking and involves consequentialist rather than interpretative
questions.131

128. Burt Neuborne argues that “judicial balancing has been subjected to deserved
academic criticism . . . because it licenses a judge to engage in overtly subjective
decision-making that replicates and occasionally displaces, identical thought-processes
already carried out by a politically responsible official.” Burt Neuborne, Notes for a
Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of Tom
Emerson, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 576, 578 (1988).
129. Thus, Ducat argues, “The approach to judicial decision-making, taken by
interest balancers, is much like that taken by political actors staffing coordinate
institutions of government who must themselves choose between rival group interests on
issues of the day.” CRAIG R. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 119
(1978). Ducat continues, “[W]e need to know how the [balancing] technique of judicial
review differs from legislative interest balancing,” and whether the principled quality of
the judicial process can be sustained at all with interest balancing. Id. at 133.
130. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977) (“The metaphor
of balancing the public interest against personal claims is established in our political and
judicial rhetoric, and this metaphor gives the model both familiarity and appeal.
Nevertheless, the model is a false one . . . .”); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment, It Is
Absurd to Calculate Human Rights According to a Cost-Benefit Analysis, GUARDIAN
(London), May 24, 2006, (Debate & Comment), at 28.
131. Laurent Frantz, who strongly objected to balancing in free speech during the
1960s, maintained that instead of treating the Constitution as a higher law and applying it
to the political organs, balancing treats the Constitution as if it were no law at all and
simply allows the Court to second guess the wisdom, rather than the legality, of certain
governmental decisions. Frantz, supra note 47, at 1433, 1441, 1443; cf. Jackson, supra
note 4, at 843 (arguing with regard to proportionality that it “may have little or no role on
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3. Bounded Balancing
As a result of the skepticism with which balancing is treated and its
clash with some of the basic tenets of American constitutionalism, its
status in American constitutional law differs greatly from its status in
German law. In Germany, balancing stands front and center as a
constitutional doctrine in the proportionality framework, while in
America, it is generally assigned a more residual and instrumental role
and is bounded by the categorical approach—hence its classification as
“bounded balancing.”
Precisely how American balancing is bounded can be illustrated by
analogy to a typology proposed by Richard Fallon regarding the doctrine
of strict scrutiny.132 Following Fallon, the proceeding sections identify
three types of balancing in American constitutional case law. The first is
balancing as smoking out. In this sense, balancing is an evidentiary tool
used to smoke out a hidden illicit governmental motive. This is termed
instrumental balancing as distinguished from German balancing, which
is attributed with intrinsic value. The second type is balancing as an
exception to the rule. Here, balancing is a tool for maintaining categorical
protection of rights by allowing for the balancing of rights against
interests in exceptional cases of extraordinary circumstances. This is
termed residual balancing because balancing is conducted only as the
exception. Third, there is true balancing. Even in instances of true
balancing, as opposed to exceptional cases, it is applied in a pragmatic
fashion, which differs substantially from the more idealistic and
formalistic style of German proportionality.
a. Balancing as Smoking Out
Balancing is used to smoke out hidden unjustified ends in American
constitutional law. The judicial decisionmaking process in any given
case is a categorical one, in that it identifies prohibited governmental

constitutional issues generally regarded within the legal community as resolved by
constitutional text itself”).
132. See Fallon, supra note 77, at 1302–11. Fallon distinguishes among the
following three understandings of strict scrutiny: “Strict Scrutiny as a Nearly Categorical
Prohibition,” “Strict Scrutiny as a Weighted Balancing Test,” and “Strict Scrutiny as an
Illicit Motive Test.” Id. This Article correlates these three interpretations with the
residual, true, and instrumental categories of balancing, respectively. See discussion
infra Part III.C.3.a–c.
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purposes that are absolutely banned under the Constitution and deems
them unconstitutional. There is no balancing entailed in the reasoning
underlying this process. However, because prohibited purposes and motives
of this kind can be camouflaged by the government as legitimate, and
because it is difficult to find concrete evidence of prohibited purposes
underlying governmental action, balancing becomes necessary. In many
instances, what is referred to as balancing is often simply a means for
smoking out illegitimate governmental objectives.
To this end, balancing can be used instrumentally in two ways. First,
balancing to smoke out illegitimate purposes can be conducted through
its means-ends tests.133 These tests look for instances in which the
means do not match the ends. Assuming government rationality, such a
lack of compatibility can be understood as indication that the stated ends
are not the genuine ends. There are two principal means-ends tests: the
existence of a close connection between the means and the end, and the
least restrictive alternative test. Cass Sunstein’s description of these two
tests as they are applied in the context of heightened scrutiny expresses
well how they are actually used to smoke out hidden illegitimate
purposes:
Heightened scrutiny involves two principal elements. The first is a requirement
that the government show a close connection between the asserted justification
and the means that the legislature has chosen to promote it. If a sufficiently
close connection cannot be shown, there is a reason for skepticism that the
asserted value in fact accounts for the legislation. The second element is a
search for less restrictive alternatives—ways in which the government could
have promoted the public value without harming the group or interest in
question. The availability of such alternatives also suggests that the public
value justification is a facade.134

An illustrative example of this smoking out is the Ho Ah Kow case,
involving the so-called Queue Ordinance, enacted in 1873, that required
the shaving of the heads of all inmates in San Francisco prisons.135
Prison hygiene—to prevent outbreaks of lice and fleas—was the alleged
reason for this law, but in a lawsuit challenging the ordinance, the
state court exposed this alleged justification as “mere pretense.”136
Using means–ends analysis to smoke out the true, illicit motive, the
court reasoned that if hygiene were the actual purpose, the ordinance
would be both underinclusive—it included only men and convicts and
133. It is sometimes argued that means-ends tests are not balancing tests at all.
However, for the purposes of this Article, it suffices to acknowledge that means-ends
tests are widely viewed as balancing tests, and moreover, in European law, they lie at the
heart of the proportionality test.
134. SUNSTEIN, supra note 121, at 30.
135. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546).
136. Id. at 254.

400

PORAT_FINAL_ARTICLE[1]

[VOL. 46: 367, 2009]

7/7/2009 3:11:15 PM

The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

not women or detainees—and overinclusive—heads could be checked
for lice instead of the sweeping measure of shaving heads.137 The real
objective, the court revealed, was to stop the influx of impoverished
Chinese immigrants—who were desperate for food and shelter—into
the prisons by requiring them to shave off an important symbol in
their culture.138 Thus, in showing that the means were unsuited to the
end, the court found that the ordinance was in fact driven by racism and
unconstitutional motives.
Second, even if the means and ends are suited, courts can conduct a
stricter sense of balancing by comparing the importance of the end—the
urgency of the government need—with the amount of harm wrought on
the right. Courts will strike down violations of rights when the harm is
disproportionate either to the actual enhancement of the interest—when
it is only marginal—or to the weight of the interest—when it is trivial.
This balancing analysis can also be seen as a smoking out process.
Because a rational actor would not ordinarily make such a poor tradeoff,
it can be assumed that the government actor in such circumstances was
motivated by goals other than those alleged. An argument in this spirit
can be found in the hypothetical in which a teacher segregates black
pupils from white pupils in the classroom for aesthetic reasons.139
Although a perfect fit between the means—the separation—and the
goal—aesthetics—is possible, the fact that the aesthetic goal is so trivial
raises suspicion that it is nothing more than an attempt at rationalizing
the racist motive.
A concrete example of this type of smoking out can be found in
Schneider, a well-known case from the 1930s in which the Supreme
Court used balancing to deem unconstitutional a ban on the distribution
of handbills in a city’s streets.140 Here, the Court identified protection of
free speech and street cleanliness as two considerations in its decision
and argued that the latter is of such negligible weight that it is easily
overridden by the former.141 That is, in the balance between free speech
and cleanliness in that particular case, free speech outweighed cleanliness.
However, the use of balancing in Schneider can be understood as

Id.
Id. at 255.
PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES
MATERIALS 489 (1975); ELY, supra note 119, at 147–48.
140. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
141. Id. at 163.
137.
138.
139.

AND
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bounded balancing because it was used to smoke out illegitimate
purposes rather than actually balance between the two interests.142 The
Court undoubtedly suspected that the laws in question were not really
motivated by concern for cleanliness, but rather by concern with the
messages on the handbills. This conclusion might have been based on
the fact that the principal group distributing handbills was the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, whose views were disturbing to many people at the time.143
However, as the Court could not easily prove that prejudice is what
underlay the ban, it used balancing as evidence of the existence of a
message-related purpose, which is unconstitutional under First Amendment
protections.144 The triviality of the cleanliness interest relative to the
free speech interest was proof that the true motive behind the regulation
was the desire to exclude disturbing and unpopular religious views.145
As previously demonstrated, such an application of balancing is
compatible with the suspiciousness of American political culture.
Rather than engaging in intrinsic balancing, courts use the instrumental
bounded balancing to uncover cases of illegitimate governmental behavior.
b. Balancing as the Exception Rather than the Rule
Another way of understanding balancing as bounded in American
constitutional law conceives of balancing as a kind of safety valve for
exceptional occurrences in which rights protection would be extremely
costly. Under this approach, balancing occurs even when it is not used
to smoke out illegitimate purposes; its use is limited in this context, and
it represents the exception in terms of rights interpretation rather than the
rule. A prominent example of this type of balancing is the application of
strict scrutiny review. Although strict scrutiny does allow for balancing,
it functions much more like a rule that bans certain considerations
altogether, such as considerations based on racial distinction. Balancing
is allowed in extreme or exceptional cases in which the rule has to be set
aside to avoid extreme outcomes.146 A second possible example is the
“clear and present danger” test of American free speech jurisprudence

142. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 47, at 831–32 (arguing that the ordinance in
Schneider was targeted at speech).
143. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 158.
144. Id. at 163–65.
145. Id.
146. See Fallon, supra note 77, at 1303–06 (arguing that strict scrutiny often
functions as a “[n]early [c]ategorical [p]rohibition” on certain types of infringements of
rights, and that balancing enters the analysis only in extreme circumstances and as an
exception to the categorical rule).
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from the early 1900s.147 This test allowed for the balancing of free speech
against security or public safety concerns, but only when there was
“clear and present danger” of public disorder.148 In effect, free speech was
interpreted as setting a high bar for the regulation of opinions, and
balancing was used only in the exceptional cases.149
The reason this type of balancing is termed “bounded” is because it is
regarded as constrained by the rule rather than as describing the regular
and standard template for rights analysis. Unlike what has been referred
to as the intrinsic sense of balancing, where the entire conception of
rights is based on the idea of balancing them with other considerations,
the American bounded approach is that balancing, even if it does exist,
represents the exception and not the rule.
c. Balancing in the Strict Sense
Admittedly, there are instances in American law in which “real”
balancing occurs, that is, when the court is engaged in the comparison
and accommodation of two competing interests or rights. This model of
balancing comes closest to German proportionality: it is founded on the
notion of the possibility of legitimate interests in conflict that require
mutual consideration, as opposed to cases in which an illegitimate
interest needs to be smoked out. However, in contrast to German
proportionality, which is based on the ambitious goal of realizing the
147. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 671 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
148. Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1297
(2007) (noting that “[t]rue balancing—a full accounting on each side of the ledger—
simply will not take place unless the probability of the asserted harm crosses the
threshold”).
149. In addition, see Rubenfeld, supra note 47, stating:
Despite appearances, the [clear and present danger test] cannot be understood
as a balancing test. It should be understood rather as a test to determine
whether an individual has intentionally used speech so closely and directly
engaged with a particularized course of prohibited conduct that the individual
may be treated as having participated in that conduct.
Id. at 829. Rubenfeld continued:
[The individual] can be punished for [participating in that conduct]—and not
because the harmfulness of his speech outweighs its benefits. The same line of
thought explains the unprotectedness of an entire set of speech acts “brigaded”
with prohibited conduct: agreements to commit unlawful acts (conspiracy),
solicitations of unlawful acts, threats, and so on.
Id. at 828.
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underlying values of the German constitution, American balancing, even
in its strict sense, is usually based on a more pragmatic and minimalist
approach. American balancing has historical ties to the pragmatic American
movement of the early twentieth century and to figures such as Holmes,
Pound, and Cardozo, who viewed law as a means to achieving social
goals and balancing as the mechanism for implementing this approach.
Thus, Holmes wrote in his Path of the Law that “judges . . . have failed
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage.”150 Cardozo invoked a balancing attitude when he wrote that
legal decisions depend “largely upon the comparative importance or
value of the social interest that will be thereby promoted or impaired.”
And Roscoe Pound wrote in favor of “a weighing of the social interest,”
arguing that “law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to
adjust . . . overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands.”151 To
this day, self-proclaimed pragmatists such as Posner, associate themselves
with balancing.152
German proportionality, for its part, must be understood as emerging
from German formalist jurisprudence. Originating in nineteenth-century
German legal science, German legal formalism views law as an
autonomous and logical science.153 Thus, despite its lofty and abstract
goals, proportionality is the product of a legal frame of mind that is far
more formalistic than the American one. In this context, the contemporary
German legal scholar Bomhoff has provided a striking description of the
differences between American balancing and German proportionality.
Referring to the German Lüth decision, Bomhoff argues:
Lüth, in this view, becomes the embodiment of the European legal culture’s will
to believe that a formal, legal conception of the judicial weighing of interests or
values is possible. Balancing, in this German or Continental view, does not
have to be about policy choices, compromises or ad hocery, but can be about
interpreting constitutional rights within a pyramidal, “objective” system of
values. Balancing is not a discretion or an option; it can be a necessity, a
constitutional obligation. Balancing may very well not “rigidify” in the way
American adjudication has according to Schauer, because it already is highly

150. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 184 (1920) (emphasis added).
151. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 39 (1943).
152. See, for example, Posner’s criticism of the rejection of balancing in First
Amendment jurisprudence, in Posner, supra note 47.
153. Indeed, a tension between radical formalism and an element of idealism and
values has always existed in German jurisprudence and, in fact, typifies it. Such
ambivalence can be found in nineteenth-century German jurisprudence. German legal
science of that same period, or Rechtwissenschaft, made extensive use of exact science
terminology to describe the scientific method by which the legal system operates;
however, the legal scientist also sought to detect the moral, national, and historic core
from which legal rules are derived. On this tension, see Reimann, supra note 87, at 882–
83.
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formal in other ways. And balancing does not need to be associated with
ideology in the same way as Duncan Kennedy describes it for the U.S., because,
put (perhaps too) bluntly: judicial balancing in constitutional cases does not
have to be politics, it can be law.154

Thus, American balancing, even in its strict sense, can be understood as
pragmatic and policy-oriented in contrast to the more abstract and
conceptual German proportionality. And in this respect, American balancing,
even in the strict sense, can be seen as bounded, albeit by pragmatic
concerns and a pragmatic attitude.
D. The Structural Constitutional Differences Between
Germany and America
The previous two sections showed how their respective political and
legal cultures have assigned different meanings to German proportionality
and American proportionality despite their analytical resemblance. This
section will show how structural factors pertaining to constitutional
architecture and the scope of constitutional rights are also responsible for
the different extents to which the two doctrines are used in their
respective legal systems. Indeed, in Germany, the expansive nature of
constitutional rights creates a structural need for balancing in its intrinsic
sense; in the United States, in contrast, the narrower scope of constitutional
rights allows for the bounded type of balancing.
Rights are considerably broader in definition and scope in Germany
than they are in America. This breadth is termed by German scholars as
the “total application” of the constitution.155 This total application features
three central characteristics. First, the wider scope of constitutional
rights in Germany has resulted from the fact that its constitution speaks
explicitly of underlying values and does not limit itself to the enumeration
of rights; this has paved the way to an expansive constitutional approach to
rights.156 Unlike rights, values are abstract entities in essence that can

154. Bomhoff, supra note 102 (footnotes omitted).
155. Mattias Kumm, Who’s Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights
as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 341–43
(2006), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol07No04/PDF_Vol_07_No_04_341370_Articles%20Kumm.pdf.
156. The German constitution opens with the words: “Human dignity shall be
inviolable,” and article 20(1) enunciates, “The Federal Republic of Germany is a
democratic and social federal state.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 1(1), 20(1)
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/
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have very broad meaning. As a result, in Germany, almost any legitimate
individual or collective interest is tied to a constitutional value and
accorded constitutional status.157 The concept of rights in Germany is so
broad that it has enabled the Constitutional Court to consider even such
trivial interests as riding horses in the woods, feeding pigeons, smoking
marijuana, and importing a certain breed of dog as constitutional
rights.158 The American Constitution, in contrast, does not speak in terms
of values but rather of enumerated rights. Furthermore, rights are often
times interpreted more narrowly by delimiting their scope or excluding
certain activities from that scope. A prominent example of this is the
right to free speech, from which certain categories of speech have been
excluded.
A second feature of this doctrine of total application is that, in contrast
to the American constitutional conception of constitutional rights as
solely negative rights,159 the German Constitutional Court has ruled that
rights also have a protective, or positive, function. More specifically,
the court has held that constitutional rights oblige the state to take any
necessary measures in order to ensure their realization.160 For example,
in 1972, it interpreted a constitutional provision guaranteeing that “all
Germans shall have the right freely to choose . . . their place of training”161
as imposing a duty on the state to provide schooling.162 In another case,
downloads/ggEn_download.pdf (English translation). See also article 19(2), which provides,
“In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.” Id. art. 19(2).
157. Limits can be placed on any constitutional right in order to advance another
constitutional value that is embedded in the constitution, either explicitly or implicitly,
and that is ranked higher on the constitutional scale of values.
158. Kumm, supra note 4, at 141.
159. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96
(1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (referring to the
American Constitution as a “charter of negative rather than positive liberties”), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); cf.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that in
the context of free speech, the Court has suggested that the “government may, and
perhaps must, act positively to reduce [private] repression [of the First Amendment]”).
160. Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in EUROPEAN AND US
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 21, at 137, 137–38.
161. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 12 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.
bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf
(English translation).
162. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18,
1972, 33 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 303 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv033303.html, stating:
The constitutional protection of basic rights in the field of education is not
limited to the protective function against governmental intervention
traditionally ascribed to the basic rights. Because the right would be worthless
without the actual ability to make use of it, the entitlement of every German
to carry out his chosen study program if he demonstrates the requisite
qualifications . . . is not in the discretion of the lawmakers.
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the court interpreted the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right
to life as placing an active duty on the state to enact criminal legislation
banning abortion, and it further ruled that the state should also act to
ensure that the mother’s economic and occupational security are not
impaired if she decides not to abort.163 In the United States, however,
the Supreme Court decided that “although government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice to
terminate her pregnancy, it need not remove those not of its own
creation.”164 That is to say, the fact that women have the right to free
choice and the state is therefore prohibited from banning abortions does
not impose on the state a positive obligation to fund abortions.
Third, unlike the American reading of the Constitution, the German
Constitutional Court has ruled that constitutional rights also apply
indirectly in the context of relations between individuals; namely, the
interpretation of the rules of private law should be in line with the values
of the constitution—the Drittwirkung doctrine.165 The American
Constitution, on the other hand, is not interpreted as granting rights
protection to individuals in their relations with other individuals, but
only to individuals vis-à-vis the state.166
Clearly, the broader the scope of constitutional rights, the more often
they will clash. Therefore, the more expansive the conception of rights,
the greater the need for a mechanism such as balancing for resolving
conflicts among rights. Because everything counts in constitutional

Id. at 330 (author’s translation). For example, the provision that secures a person’s
freedom to choose his or her specific vocation of study obliges the state to finance the
studies. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 871 (1986).
163. The second abortion case can be found in Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 203 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/
bv088203.html, discussed in Kommers, supra note 86, at 870.
164. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (emphasis added).
165. Lüth, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan.
15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 198 (F.R.G.)
(author’s translation), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv007198.html; see
also Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 387, 415 (2003) (stressing the impact of constitutions on the rules of private law).
166. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). An exception to this
rule can be found in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), in which the Court would
not enforce a racist restrictive covenant, as court decisions constitute state actions. Id. at
4, 20. For criticism of Shelley, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (1959).

407

PORAT_FINAL_ARTICLE[1]

7/7/2009 3:11:15 PM

adjudication, rights are often conceived in Germany as an “optimization
requirement.”167 In the United States, the narrower conception of rights
makes conflict less pervasive. Moreover, constitutional rights are often
perceived in America as shorthand for applying exclusionary reasons visà-vis the government, or limiting the scope of legitimate governmental
ends.168 Whereas conflict is inherent in the German notion of rights
as an optimization requirement and, hence, balancing is essential, the
American concept of rights as exclusionary reasons makes conflict less
likely because protecting rights means striking down illegitimate
purposes rather than promoting legitimate ones. Balancing is therefore
needed in the latter in its bounded sense of smoking out illegitimate
purposes and not in the intrinsic sense.
IV. AFTERWORD: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF HELLER FOR THE
FOREIGN LAW DEBATE
This Article has attempted to show that, although there are no
substantial analytical and doctrinal differences between American
balancing and German proportionality, different meanings are assigned
to each of these doctrines and they serve different functions in their respective
legal systems. In Germany—which is the birthplace of proportionality
and the most influential model of it—proportionality is a principal
doctrine that encompasses such intrinsic values as moderation and
compromise and that acts to integrate society under shared values. In
addition, the expansive nature of rights under German constitutionalism
creates a structural need for intrinsic balancing, making proportionality
inevitable and central to the German model. In America, on the other

167. ALEXY, supra note 104, at 44, 47–48, 67, 397; HESSE, supra note 98, at 27,
30–31.
168. The term “exclusionary reasons” is taken from Josph Raz’s practical reasoning
philosophy. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35 (1999). It has been
applied to describe American constitutional law. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
711, 711–12 (1994); see also Iddo Porat, On the Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, Balancing
Tests, and Three Kinds of Multicultural Claims, 1 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 429, 430,
440–41 (2007), http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol1/iss1/art13/ (follow download link to
access article); Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393,
1417–23 (2006). Some authors, while not making direct use of the term, have a similar
conception of rights in American law. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 130, at 197–201,
234–36 (arguing rights are constructs designed to exclude those instances in which
history has shown that the utilitarian tends to be corrupted by external preferences);
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1142 (1986) (interpreting the
Commerce Clause as “excluding” protectionist motives); Rubenfeld, supra note 47, at
768, 779–82, 787, 832 (advocating a nonbalancing approach to free speech law in the
United States).
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hand, balancing is more secondary and bounded by a more categorical
approach towards rights. It is instrumental in smoking out illicit
motives, it serves as proxy for a categorical approach, and when true
balancing does take place, it is subsidiary and applied in a pragmatic
fashion, quite different from the more idealistic and structured German
model. Indeed, the narrower conception of rights in the United States
gives rise to this subsidiary use of balancing, making it less central in
American constitutional law.
In the context of the ongoing foreign law debate in the U.S. Supreme
Court, it can be argued that Justice Breyer’s move in Heller was not at
all dramatic. If all that Justice Breyer did was label the specific type of
balancing conducted in America with a foreign name, then he did not
change the nature of that balancing. By using the term “proportionality”
per se, he did not mandate the adoption of the German sense of intrinsic
balancing. But this is true only to a certain extent: If the experience of
other legal systems is any indication, the use of common terminology
and common language may have drawn legal systems closer to one
another. In that respect, Justice Breyer’s tactic was not only backward
looking—in showing similarities between American law and foreign
law—but it was also forward looking—creating a shared framework for
dialogue and a mutual exchange of ideas between the United States
and other democratic societies. Canada serves as a telling example of
such a process.
In Canada, the introduction of proportionality into its constitutional
law was accompanied by the introduction of continental organic
conceptions of the state and an intrinsic type of balancing. While this
does not establish a causal connection between proportionality and the
migration of the German and continental constitutional model, it might
nonetheless be an indication of the ability of proportionality to facilitate
such a development by creating a common language, which allows for
easier global migration. Indeed, although Canadian constitutional law
has always diverged in many respects from the American system,169 it is
169. Although the American Declaration of Independence speaks of “life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness” principles that are commonly tied to Lockean libertarian
ideas, the Canadian Constitution speaks of “peace, order and good government”
principles that are tied to a more communitarian conception of the polity and that assume
good faith on the part of the government rather than being wary of it. See RAND DYCK,
CANADIAN POLITICS: CRITICAL APPROACHES (3d ed. 2000). Of note also is the following
statement made by Alberta’s former premier on the reasons why Canada should not
adopt a constitutional bill of rights: “Canada has always operated under the
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a common law system and is more closely tied to the Anglo-American
legal tradition than to the continental one.170 However, in several
Supreme Court decisions over the last two decades, there is very clear
evidence of a European type of reasoning and of what has been termed
in this Article as intrinsic balancing; such analyses were not previously
present in the Court’s jurisprudence.171
This analytical evolution has been noted by commentators who argue
that continental constitutional ideas—in particular, the language of
underlying values and the broad conception of rights—have been imported
into Canada.172 As previously mentioned, this coincided with the
adoption of proportionality and its evolution into the central doctrine in
Canadian Charter jurisprudence.173 Indeed, in 1986, four years after the
adoption of the Canadian Charter, the Canadian Supreme Court recognized
the European doctrine of proportionality by interpreting Section 1 of the
Charter as including it.174 In the years to come, proportionality analysis
principles of responsible government and the sovereignty of the people as expressed
through their legislators who are accountable to the people.” Janet Hiebert, The
Evolution of the Limitation Clause, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 103, 110 (1990) (emphasis
added). Some commentators speak specifically in terms of the symbiotic ties between
the judiciary and the state in Canada. See Jamie Cameron, The Original Conception of
Section 1 and Its Demise: A Comment on Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Quebec,
35 MCGILL L.J. 253, 262 (1989); Ruth Colker, Section 1, Contextuality, and the AntiDisadvantage Principle, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 77, 84–85, 100–05 (1992); Robin M. Elliot,
The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1: The Erosion of the Common Front, 12
QUEEN’S L.J. 277, 277–81 (1987); Frank Iacobucci, The Evolution of Constitutional
Rights and Corresponding Duties: The Leon Ladner Lecture, U. B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–17
(1992).
170. For an account of the liberal Dworkinian ideas on the 1982 Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 38.1–.3
(5th ed. 2007); see also DAVID BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
63, 108–09, 127 (1995); Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, The Supreme Court of Canada and
Section One of the Charter, 10 SUP. CT. L. REV. 469, 512 (1988).
171. See Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); R. v. Butler,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.) (pornography); R.v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.)
(hate speech).
172. See sources cited infra notes 182, 186.
173. Proportionality law entered Canada in 1986. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
103 (Can.). The judgments with the “organic” style of reasoning are all from the 1990s.
See cases cited supra note 171.
174. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which is often referred to as the “Limitation
Clause,” set the terms for the justifiable restriction of rights: “The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.” Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). This clause was interpreted in Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, to
include the following proportionality test, which is very similar to the German test:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective
in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational
considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective.
Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first
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became almost synonymous with constitutional analysis in Canada,
becoming the most important doctrine in Canadian constitutional law.175
At the same time, several Canadian Supreme Court decisions using
proportionality showed a clear continental influence. In the Keegstra
case,176 for example, which dealt with hate speech, the court—
following what seems to be classic “organic” legal reasoning—ruled
that the limitation clause has a dual function that links the guarantee of
rights and freedoms to their limitations.177 Both rights and their
limitations stem from the same set of values, which is embedded in the
phrase “free and democratic society.”178 The role of the court is, hence,
to weigh competing legitimate interests and to find the appropriate
balance that best realizes these underlying values. In particular, the
court considers which of the values are most closely connected to the
paramount value of Canadian multiculturalism, similar to the human
dignity prism in German constitutional law. The Canadian court stated
that “Canada possesses a multicultural society in which the diversity and
richness of various cultural groups is a value to be protected and enhanced”;
furthermore, it held that “[m]ulticulturalism cannot be preserved let alone
enhanced if free rein is given to the promotion of hatred against identifiable
cultural groups.”179 It is important to note that the dissenting opinion
criticized the majority for watering down the distinction between rights and
interests, arguing that the court was depicting a conflict “between
philosophies” and “not between rights.”180
A second case that manifested even more clearly the migration of
constitutional organic ideas is the Quebec Secession case, which dealt
with the terms by which Quebec can secede from the Canadian

sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question.
Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the
objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance.”
Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
175. See generally Sujit Choudhry, So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two
Decades of Proportionality Analysis Under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1, 34 SUP.
CT. L. REV. 501, 505–21 (2006) (explaining the dominant role of proportionality analysis
in Canadian constitutional law).
176. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 735–36.
177. Id.
178. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.).
179. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 757, 758.
180. Id. at 833 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
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Federation.181 In this decision, the court used particularly expansive
language that echoed the underlying values rhetoric typical of the German
and continental organic conception of the state.182 The constitution,
declared the Canadian court, “is more than a written text. It embraces
the entire global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of
constitutional authority.”183 Balancing between these principles ensures
that “[n]o single principle can be defined in isolation from the others,
nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of any
other.”184 Judicial reasoning is therefore not about exclusionary reasons;
it is instead about moderation and compromise between competing and
valid principles. In this case in particular, the outcome of the balancing
analysis was tied to the values of moderation and compromise associated
with intrinsic balancing. The court imposed a positive duty on both
sides to negotiate in good faith the terms of secession.185 The case also
served to promote dialogue in which the court and elected bodies bear
joint constitutional responsibility.186
The Canadian example is a far cry from conclusive proof that the
introduction of proportionality language into U.S. jurisprudence would
result in a similar subsequent adoption of the European organic conception
of the state. Compared to the United States, Canada may have been
much more receptive to continental ideas from the outset. However, the
Canadian case does seem to offer some evidence that proportionality
facilitates the infiltration of continental constitutional ideas into a common
law judicial system. At the very least, the appearance of proportionality
seems to coincide with the adoption of a continental organic-based
approach.
In conclusion, although this Article tried to show that American
balancing is a distinct phenomenon from European proportionality in
181. See Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (presenting a
full evaluation of the procedures for Quebec to secede from Canada).
182. Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Underlying Principles and the Migration
of Reasoning Templates: A Trans-Systemic Reading of Quebec Secession Reference, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 25, at 178, 189–207.
183. Reference re Secession of Que., 2 S.C.R. at 292.
184. Id. at 248.
185. The Court ruled that “[n]o negotiations could be effective if their ultimate
outcome, secession, is cast as an absolute legal entitlement based upon an obligation to
give effect to that act of secession in the Constitution. Such a foregone conclusion
would actually undermine the obligation to negotiate and render it hollow.” Id. at 267.
186. See Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec
Secession Reference, 13 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 143, 160 (2000), who argue that the
Canadian Court has in fact adopted a model of “joint constitutional responsibility.” Id.
Under this theory, in extraordinary cases in which the court lacks the institutional
competency or legitimacy to translate abstract constitutional ideals into judicially
enforceable standards, “it is for the political organs of the Constitution to frame their
own interpretation of those norms and to assess their own compliance with them.” Id.
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terms of meaning and function, this may change over time. The use of
the term proportionality may help to open the door for European influences
on American constitutional law. Arguably, such a move should have
been done more openly by making the reference to foreign law explicit
rather than implicit.
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